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NOTES
DISCLOSURE OF SOFT INFORMATION IN TENDER
OFFERS AFTER FLYNN V. BASS BROTHERS
ENTERPRISES, INC.
In response to the stock market crash of October 1929,1 Congress passed
the Securities Act of 19332 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 ('34 Act) to place emphasis on disclosure of information to the investing

public. 4 The '33 Act focuses on the registration, offer, and sale of new issues

of securities.' The '34 Act focuses on the trading of securities, the regulation
of securities exchanges, and the activities of securities brokers, dealers, and

1. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 120-21 (2d ed. 1961). On September 1, 1929,
the aggregate value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $89 billion. Id.
at 120. During October 1929, the total value of the stock fell by $18 billion. Id. By 1932 the
aggregate value of New York Stock Exchange stocks had fallen to $15 billion. Id.
2. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§77a77aa (1982)).
3..Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§78a-78kk (1982)).
4. See I L. Loss, supra note 1, at 21. Throughout the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), Congress expressed a recurrent theme of
disclosure. Id. In adopting the '33 Act, Congress sought to supervise the investment in securities
in interstate commerce by requiring every issue of new securities to provide to the public full
publicity and information regarding the securities issue, and to refrain from concealing any
important elements attending the securities issue from the buying public. See H. R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprintedin 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1933-1982 138, 138-39. Congress stated that the '33 Act disclosure requirements would provide
investors with adequate public information to enable investors to make an accurate judgment
concerning the value of the security. Id. at 140. In enacting the '34 Act, Congress sought to
deal with the problem of secrecy surrounding the financial condition of corporations whose
securities are publicly traded. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprintedin I
FEDERAL SEcURiTn-s LAWs LEGISATrv
HISTORY 1933-1982 708, 712, 717-18. The '34 Act
requires corporations to file reasonably up to date information with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) as long as the security is traded on a national exchange. Id. at 717. Congress
stated that the disclosure of updated information is necessary to enable the investor to have an
intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. See
H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982 794, 804.
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (1982) (15 USC §77e(c) of '33 Act prohibits any person
from selling or offering to buy any unregistered security); id. §77e(b) (15 USC § 77e(b) of '33
Act prohibits any person from using mails or interstate commerce to carry any security for
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless such security is accompanied or preceded by
prospectus); id. §§77k-l (15 USC §§77k-I of the '33 Act provide that persons involved in filing
materially false or incomplete registration statements or violating prospectus requirements shall
be liable and may be sued at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction); id. §77t
(15 USC §77t empowers SEC to seek federal court injunctive relief against any person engaged
or about to engage in any acts that violate '33 Act).
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underwriters. 6 In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act amendments 7 to
require the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders in the event
of a tender offer. 8 Prior to the adoption of the Williams Act, a void in
investor protection existed because the securities laws did not regulate tender

6. See, e.g., id. §781 (15 USC § 781 of '34 Act prohibits any member, broker, or dealer
from effecting any transaction in any security on national security exchange unless security is
registered with exchange); id. §78m (15 USC §78m of '34 Act requires that every issuer registered
pursuant to 15 USC §781 must file periodic and other reports with SEC); id. §78j (15 USC §78j
of '34 Act prohibits any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with
purchase or sale of securities); id. §78e (15 USC §78e of '34 Act prohibits use of any exchange
facility to effect any transaction or to report such transaction involving any security unless such
exchange is registered as national securities exchange with SEC); id. §78f (15 USC § 78f states
that exchange may not register as national securities exchange unless SEC determines that
exchange has adopted rules to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, and to provide for appropriate discipline of exchange members
for any violation of securities laws); id. §78o(a) (15 USC §78o(a) prohibits any persons from
engaging in broker or dealer transactions unless such persons are registered with SEC); id.
§78o(b) (15 USC §78o(b) states that SEC may revoke or suspend brokers' or dealers' registration,
or impose censure for violation of securities laws).
7. Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982)). In response to the significant increase in cash tender offers during the 1960's,
Congress enacted the Williams Act to ensure that tender offerors would provide target company
shareholders with material information concerning the tender offer so that shareholders could
decide rationally the best possible course of action. See H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812-13 (hereinafter cited
as H. R. REP. No. 1711). Senator Williams stated that Congress attempted to avoid regulating
in favor of management or the tender offeror. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967). Senator Williams
further stated that the Act requires full and fair disclosure to the investors while providing the
offeror and management an equal opportunity fairly to present their cases. Id. at 854-55.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d), n(d) (1982). 15 U.S.C. §78n(d) prohibits any person from
making a tender offer that would result in that person's beneficial ownership of greater than
5% of such security unless at the time of the tender offer such person has disclosed the
information specified in 15 U.S.C. §78m(d). Id. §78n(d). 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) provides that a
tender offeror under 15 U.S.C. §78n(d) must file with the SEC and send to the issuer of the
security a statement disclosing the identity and background of the purchaser, the source and
amount of consideration paid and any borrowings required to purchase the securities, the
number of shares of the target company of which the offeror is the beneficial owner, any side
agreement entered into with respect to the stock, any plans regarding the disposal of all or part
of the target corporation's assets, any intended merger activity, and any major change intended
in the business or corporate structure. Id. §78m(d).
Although Congress did not define the term "tender offer" in the Williams Act, Senator
Williams stated that a cash tender offer is a public invitation from the tender offeror to all
shareholders of a corporation to sell their shares at a specific price within a specific time. See
113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (Senator Williams' definition of tender offer). The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that seven elements are generally
present in a tender offer. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (1979). The
Wellman court stated that tender offerors usually engage in active and widespread solicitation
of public shareholders of an issuer, solicit for a substantial percentage of issuer's stock, offer
to purchase stock at a premium over market price, offer a firm price rather than negotiable,
make offer contingent on the tender of a minimum number of shares, extend offer for a limited
period of time, and subject offeree to pressure to tender the stock. Id.
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offer activities. 9 To achieve the goal of investor protection, section 14(e) of
the Williams Act prohibits false or misleading statements, material omissions,
and fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices in connection with any
tender offer.' 0 The broad antifraud provisions of section 14(e) apply to the
parties extending the tender offer as well as to the management of the target
company. "
Both the '33 Act and the '34 Act, including the Williams Act amendments, require the filing of informational documents with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC). 2 Companies may include both "hard information" and "soft information" in documents filed with the SEC.' 3 Soft
9. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (Senator Williams
introduced original form of bill subjecting tender offerors to advance disclosure requirements
in October 1965 to remedy gap in federal regulation of securities). In introducing his proposed
legislation, Senator Williams illustrated the need to fill the gap in the securities regulations by
noting that when a party seeks control of a corporation through either an exchange offer of
stock or a proxy contest, the party is subject to disclosure requirements under the Securities
Act of 1933. 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967). In situations involving cash tender offers to shareholders, however, Senator Williams noted that the tender offeror is not required to disclose any
information. Id. Senator Williams concluded that the ability of a tender offeror to operate in
almost complete secrecy is inconsistent with the disclosure pattern prevailing in American
securities markets. Id.; see also H. R. RP. No. 1711, supra note 7, at 2812. In 1968, the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee stated that under current law the investor is
severely limited in obtaining all of the facts on which to base a decision whether to reject or
accept the tender offer unless the management of the target company publicly responds to the
tender offer. Id. The Committee concluded that the Federal securities laws are specifically
designed to prevent investors from having to make decisions without adequate information. Id.
10. See 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (Williams Act §14(e)). §14(e) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statement made,
in light of all the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer....
Id.
11. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 945 (2d
Cir. 1969) (Williams Act insures that target company shareholders will have benefit of complete
statement from offeror and opportunity to hear incumbent management explain its position);
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 420 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (Williams Act
designed to guarantee that shareholders have sufficient information about tender offer from
both tender offeror and management of target company); see also 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-2 (1984)
(SEC rule 14e-2). Rule 14e-2 provides that to effectuate §14(e) of the '34 Act, the target
company must publish or send to shareholders one of three responses to the tender offer no
later than ten business days from the date of the tender offer. Id. Management of the corporation
may recommend acceptance or rejection of the offer, state that the company expresses no
opinion and is remaining neutral toward the offer, or state reasons for being unable to take a
position with respect to the tender offer. Id.
12. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§229.10-230.656 (1984) (Regulation S-K) (listing nonfinancial
information that persons must file pursuant to '33 Act and '34 Act); 17 C.F.R. §§210.1-01210.12-29 (1984) (Regulation S-X) (listing financial information that persons must file pursuant
to '33 Act and '34 Act); Regulation 13D (reporting requirements for tender offerors pursuant
to 15 USC §78m of '34 Act).
13. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §229.10 (1984) (Regulation S-K, Item 10(b)) (SEC encourages
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information includes forecasts of earnings, revenues, budgets for capital
expenditures, future dividend policies, management analyses of financial
statements, and any other forward looking information.14 Soft information
is often unreliable because soft information is based upon inferences and
speculation rather than hard data. 5 In contrast, hard information includes
historical and objectively verifiable data such as current or past financial
information.' 6 Prior to 1973, the SEC limited disclosure requirements to hard
information because the SEC feared that unsophisticated investors 7 would
accord soft information a greater measure of validity than such information

disclosure, in documents filed with SEC under '33 Act and '34 Act, of management's projections
of future economic performance that have reasonable basis and are presented in appropriate
format); 17 C.F.R. §229.301 (1984) (Regulation S-K, Item 301) (registrant must file with SEC
financial data for last five fiscal years representing net sales or operating revenues, income from
operations, income per share, total assets, long-term obligations and redeemable preferred stock,
and cash dividends declared per common share).
14. See HousE Comm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO TiE SECURITIES

AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION 347 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] (soft information
includes opinions, predictions, analyses and other subjective evaluations). Professor Schnieder
identified five categories of soft information. See Schnieder, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information
in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972). The first category contains forward-looking
statements such as projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and
expectations. Id. The second category of soft information includes statements concerning past
or present information when the maker of the statement lacks the data necessary to prove the
accuracy of the statement. Id. An example of the second type of soft information is when a
company provides historical market share percentages within an industry without access to
precise statistics concerning each competitor. Id. The third category involves information based
primarily on subjective evaluations, such as representations concerning the competence or
integrity of management, the relative efficiency of a manufacturing operation, or the appraised
value of assets. Id. The fourth category involves unverified statements of motive, purpose, or
intention of management, such as an explanation of the reasons for which the company
discharged an auditor. Id. The fifth category involves statements containing qualifying words
for which no generally accepted objective standards of measurement exist. Id. Examples of such
qualifying words include excellent, ingenious, efficient and imaginative. Id.
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing types of soft information).
16. See REPORT, supra note 14, at 347 (hard information includes statements concerning
objectively verifiable historical facts). No sharp dividing line exists between hard and soft
information. See Schnieder, supra note 14, at 256. For example, audited historical financial
statements are considered a classic type of hard information although many subjective evaluations and other types of soft information such as reserves for bad debts and extent of completion
and profitability of open contracts must be considered in preparing audited financials. Id. at
256 & 256 n.5.
17. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (unsophisticated investor is investor that lacks substantial knowledge of finance). The
Leasco court equated the unsophisticated investor with the average small investor who is not a
knowledgeable student of finance. Id. The Leasco court further stated that three distinct classes
of investors exist, including amateurs who read for the most obvious sorts of disclosures,
professional advisors and managers who study disclosures closely and make their decisions on
insights that they gain from such disclosures, and security analysts who use disclosures as one
of the many sources of an investment opportunity. Id. at 565-66.
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would deserve. '8 In 1973, however, the SEC reversed its position of discouraging
the disclosure of soft information and began to encourage such disclosure.9
The SEC presently encourages but does not require the disclosure of soft
information.2 0 Accordingly, courts have not required the disclosure of soft
information in tender offer transactions. 2' Recently, however, the United
18. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973) (policy
against disclosure of asset appraisals is based on SEC's distrust of appraisals' reliability and
SEC's fear that investors would accord such appraisals more weight than warranted).
19. See Securities Act Release No. 5362 (February 2, 1973). As a result of public hearings
held in 1972, the SEC announced that a change in its policy not to permit inclusion of
projections in registration statements and reports filed with SEC would assist in the protection
of investors and serve the public interest. Id. In April 1975, the SEC proposed an elaborate
disclosure system regarding projections of economic performance. See Securities Act Release
No. 5581 (April 25, 1975). The SEC later withdrew the 1975 proposal and in April 1976 issued
a statement that the SEC would not object to disclosure of projections made in good faith with
a reasonable basis and in an appropriate format, provided that such disclosure is accompanied
by sufficient information for investors to make their own judgment. See Securities Act Release
No. 5696 (April 23, 1976).
In 1978, the SEC issued a statement encouraging companies to disclose management
projections both in filings with the SEC and in general, and authorized the Division of
Corporation Finance to publish Revised Guide 62 to assist in the implementation of such
disclosures. See Securities Act Release No. 5992 (November 7, 1978). Guide 62 reaffirmed the
SEC's requirement that projections of future performance must be made in good faith and with
a reasonable basis. Id. Although the Guide did not set forth items that had to be included in
projections, the Guide did caution management to avoid misleading inferences through selective
disclosure of only favorable items. Id. When previously disclosed projections no longer had a
reasonable basis, the Guide established that management had a duty to update such projections.
Id. Finally, the Division of Corporation Finance also encouraged the disclosure of the assumptions on which the parties based the projections. Id. the SEC rescinded Guide 62 in 1982 and
incorporated the substance of the Guide in Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. §229.10 (1984).
In 1979, to encourage disclosure of projections, the SEC established a safe harbor
provision protecting issuers of projections reasonably based and disclosed in good faith from
liability under the federal securities laws whenever the projected results fail to materialize. See
Securities Act Release No. 6084 (June 25, 1979). The safe harbor rule applies to projections of
revenues, income, earnings per share, capital expenditures and financing, dividends, capital
structure, statements of managements' plans and objectives for future operations and future
economic performance included in management's discussion and analysis of the summary of
earnings or quarterly income statements. Id. Release No. 6084 establishes that the burden of
proof concerning the applicability of the safe harbor rule is on the plaintiff. 7d.
20. See Securities Act Release No. 5992. The SEC adopted the Advisory Committee's
view that a voluntary projection disclosure system is more appropriate than a mandatory system.
Id. The Advisory Committee suggested that the SEC did not yet have an adequate basis for
formulating a mandatory system. Id. Further, the Committee stated that all companies should
not be required to bear the expense and burden of such disclosure, especially because many
companies would find it difficult to prepare appropriate projections due to a lack of operating
history, general economic factors, or industry conditions. Id.
21. See Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 216 (6th Cir. 1984) (management of
target company has no duty to disclose reports containing financial projections and speculative
assumptions); South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265,
1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (target company has no duty to disclose asset valuations in proxy materials
concerning proposed sale of substantially all corporate assets to purchasing corporation); Panter
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States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Flynn v. Bass
Brothers Enterprises, Inc.,22 held that a party extending a tender offer has a
duty to disclose material soft information to target company shareholders to
23
avoid liability under section 14(e) of the Williams Act.
In Flynn, the president of Prochemco, Inc. (Prochemco) contacted the
privately held Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. (Bass Brothers) in 1974 attempting to persuade Bass Brothers to finance Prochemco's planned purchase
of a controlling interest of outstanding stock of the National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling Company (National Alfalfa). 24 National Alfalfa's businesses consisted of farming, farm supply operations, and the sale of animal
feed. 2 Prochemco, a corporation engaged in ranching and cattle feeding,
had previous acquisition experience. 26 As part of the financing proposal
presented to Bass Brothers and other financial sources, Prochemco prepared
two reports containing appraisals of National Alfalfa's assets based on
alternative hypothetical valuations. 27 Bass Brothers declined to finance the
proposed purchase, but indicated an interest in purchasing National Alfalfa's
stock should Prochemco's plans fail to materialize. 2s Following Prochemco's
unsuccessful attempts to procure financing, in December 1975 Bass Brothers
purchased 1.3 million shares of National Alfalfa stock for 6.47 dollars per

v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir.) (neither management nor directors have
duty to disclose financial projections prepared in response to tender offer), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil and Gas, 566 F. Supp. 54, 64 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) (Williams Act does not require disclosure of soft information). But see Radol v.
Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 594 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (parties involved in tender offer transaction
have duty to disclose material soft information to target company shareholders), aff'd, 772 F.2d
244 (6th Cir. 1985); infra notes 62-77 (discussion of Radol).
22. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 988; see supra note 10 (text of '34 Act § 14(e)).
24. See 744 F.2d at 981. In Flynn, Prochemco, Inc. (Prochemco) advanced a proposal to
secure financial support from Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. (Bass Brothers) to enable Prochemco to purchase a controlling interest of National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling Company
(National Alfalfa) stock from National Alfalfa's former president, Charles Peterson. Id. Bass
Brothers rejected Prochemco's request for financial backing and Bass Brothers decided to
purchase Peterson's block of stock and extend a tender offer for National Alfalfa stock. Id. at
981-82. Former National Alfalfa shareholders filed suit against Bass Brothers alleging that by
failing to disclose appraisal valuations of National Alfalfa's assets to National Alfalfa's
shareholders, Bass Brothers, as tender offeror, violated §14(e) of the '34 Act. Id. at 982-83.
25. Id. at 981.

26. Id. at 981, 988.
27. Id. at 981. In Flynn, Prochemco prepared asset valuation reports that contained several
alternative valuations of National Alfalfa. Id. at 982. The first report stated that $6.40 per
share could be realized through liquidation of National Alfalfa under stress conditions, $12.40
per share could be realized through liquidation over a reasonable period of time, and $16.40
per share represented National Alfalfa's value as an ongoing operation. Id. The second report
prepared by Prochemco stated that $17.28 per share represented the value of National Alfalfa
according to Peterson's calculations and $7.60 per share represented the value according to
Prochemco's calculations. Id.
28. Id. at 981.
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On March 2, 1976, Bass Brothers made public its tender offer for

any and all outstanding shares of National Alfalfa stock at 6.45 dollars per
share) 0 Bass Brothers did not disclose the contents or existence of the reports
Prochemco had prepared." At the expiration of the tender offer, Bass
Brothers owned more than 92 percent of the outstanding shares of National
2
Alfalfa and took control of the company.1

Subsequent to Bass Brothers' acquisition of National Alfalfa, minority
shareholders of National Alfalfa initiated a class action against Bass Brothers

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

3

The plaintiffs alleged that Bass Brothers violated the '34 Act by failing to
disclose the Prochemco asset appraisal valuations.3 4 The plaintiffs asserted
that the asset appraisal valuations would have aided the class members in
deciding whether to accept the tender offer.3 s The plaintiffs also alleged that

by not disclosing the valuations, Bass Brothers violated section 10(b)3 6 and
rule lOb- 5

7

of the '34 Act.', The district court denied Bass Brothers' motion

29. Id. In Flynn, prior to Bass Brothers' purchase of Peterson's stock, Prochemco
informed Bass Brothers that Peterson's stock was available for purchase since Prochemco was
unable to obtain financing to purchase Peterson's stock. Id. Bass Brothers paid Prochemco
$130,000 in exchange for the two reports and for Prochemco's assistance in analyzing National
Alfalfa's current and potential performance. Id. In December 1975, Bass Brothers entered into
an option agreement to purchase Peterson's 52% controlling interest in National Alfalfa. Id.
Bass Brothers later exercised this option and purchased approximately 1.3 million shares for
$8.44 million. Id.
30. Id. In Flynn, prior to the tender offer, Bass Brothers purchased an additional 9.1%
of National Alfalfa stock at $6.45 per share. Id. at 982.
31. Id. On March 15, 1976, Bass Brothers issued a supplement to the tender offer advising
National Alfalfa shareholders that the fair market values of National Alfalfa's land could be
substantially higher than the original costs represented on National Alfalfa's books. Id. The
supplement further provided that in the case of liquidation, stockholders could receive an
amount per share significantly higher than book value and possibly higher than the $6.45 tender
offer price. Id. The supplement to the tender offer added that the offeror had no reason to
believe that National Alfalfa intended a liquidation of assets and that the offeror had no
intention of liquidating the company. Id.
32. Id. In Flynn, after the completion of the tender offer, Bass Brothers elected a new
board of directors. Id. Soon thereafter, Bass Brothers effected a short-form merger under
Delaware law between National Alfalfa and Bass Brothers Farming Company, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Bass Brothers. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 981-83.
35. Id. at 983.
36. See 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1982) (§10(b) of the '34 Act prohibits any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
37. See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1984) (rule lOb-5 prohibits manipulative and deceptive
devices, untrue statements or omissions of material facts, and any fraudulent acts or practices
in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
38. 744 F.2d at 983. In addition to their §14(e), §10(b), and rule lOb-5 claims, the
plaintiffs in Flynn challenged the merger of National Alfalfa with Bass Brothers Farming
Company by asserting that the merger had no business purpose and thus violated Delaware
law. Id. at 991.
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for summary judgment, stating that a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether a reasonable investor would have viewed the omitted valuations
as significant to the decision concerning the tender offer.3 9 At the conclusion
of the plaintiffs' case, however, the district court granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict concerning the plaintiffs' allegation that Bass
Brothers had a duty to disclose the Prochemco valuations. 40 In granting the
directed verdict in favor of the defendant, the district court held that Bass

Brothers did not have a duty to disclose the valuations
because Prochemco
4
did not base the valuations on sufficient information. '
Although the Third Circuit on appeal affirmed the district court's
decision 4 2 the Third Circuit formulated new law for application in the future
concerning the duty of a tender offeror to disclose soft information.4 3 The
Third Circuit first acknowledged that Congress enacted the Williams Act to
ensure that shareholders faced with a tender offer would not be forced to
respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offeror. 44 Comparing the thrust of section 14(e) of the
Williams Act to that of rule lOb-5, the Flynn court stated that the broad

antifraud provision of section 14(e) protects shareholders by requiring tender
offerors to disclose
in advance any material fact in connection with the
45
tender offer.
Relying on previous United States Circuit Courts of Appeal decisions,

the Flynn court held that the definition of material fact promulgated by the
Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 46 involving a rule
14a-9 claim also is applicable in situations involving section 14(e). 47 Rule
14a-9 proscribes any statement made in connection with a proxy solicitation
39. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 484, 491 (E.D.Pa. 1978), aff'd,
744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
40. See 744 F.2d at 983.
41. Id. In granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the district court in
Flynn indicated that the data contained in the Prochemco reports lacked an adequate basis
because Prochemco prepared the reports for a different transaction than the Bass Brothers'
tender offer. Id.
42. See 744 F.2d at 991.
43. See id. at 988; see also infra text accompanying notes 78-81 (Flynn court established
balancing test for determining tender offeror's duty to disclose soft information).
44. Id. at 984; see also Pondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (purpose
of Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders confronted with tender offer will have
adequate information concerning qualifications and intentions of offering party); supra note 7
(legislative history concerning adoption of Williams Act).
45. See 744 F.2d at 984; see also supra note 10 (Williams Act §14(e) mandates disclosure
of material facts); supra notes 36-37 (discussing §10(b) and rule lOb-5 of '34 Act).
46. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
47. See 744 F.2d at 985 (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)); see also Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982) (Third Circuit adopted
TSC Industriesstandard of materiality in case involving claims under § 14(e)); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit adopted TSC Industries definition
of materiality in claim involving misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in connection
with tender offer), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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that is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact. 48 In TSC Industries, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants violated rule 14a-9 by omitting material facts from a proxy

statement concerning the liquidation and sale of TSC Industries' assets to
the defendants by means of a stock transfer. 49 The Supreme Court held that

an omitted fact is material when a substantial likelihood exists that a
reasonable investor would have viewed the disclosure of the fact as important
in deciding how to vote. 0 The Supreme Court added that the standard
contemplates a showing that the omitted fact would have assumed actual

significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder and not that
the disclosure necessarily would have caused the reasonable investor to change
his vote."'
Turning to the issue of disclosure involving soft information, the Flynn
court stated that as a matter of public policy the SEC and the courts have
not required the disclosure of such information in connection with tender

offers and proxy materials.12 The Flynn court noted that previous courts
addressing the issue relied on several rationales in not requiring the disclosure
of soft information in materials concerning proxies or tender offers. 3 First,
courts have relied on the SEC's former policy of discouraging the disclosure
of soft information.5 4 Second, courts have not required disclosure of soft
information where the particular data at issue lacked reliability. 5 Finally,
courts have been reluctant to impose liability for nondisclosure when the law
48. See 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9 (1984) (rule 14a-9 prohibits use of any false, misleading or
omitted statements with respect to any material fact in connection with proxy solicitation).
49. 426 U.S. at 442-43.
50. Id. at 449.
51. Id. In reversing the Seventh Circuit's decision that material facts include all facts that
a reasonable shareholder might consider important, the Supreme Court in TSC Industries stated
that the Seventh Circuit's lower standard of materiality would force managers to inundate
shareholders with trivial information to protect the company from substantial liability. Id. at
448.
52. 744 F.2d at 985.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 986; see also South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation
Co., 699 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (courts and SEC have discouraged inclusion of asset
appraisals in proxy materials); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir.
1973) (SEC's policy against disclosure of asset appraisals in proxy statements stems from concern
that investors would accord appraisals more weight than warranted and because of impracticability of SEC staff having to determine reliability of each appraisal); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.) (SEC and courts discourage presentations of future
earnings, appraised asset valuations and other hypothetical data in proxy materials), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 819
(D. Del. 1974) (SEC discourages insertion of asset valuations in filings with SEC).
55. See 744 F.2d at 986; see also South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley
Irrigation, Co., 699 F.2d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (valuations are properly excludable when
no objective or reasonably certain data exists to support such valuations); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.) (no duty exists to disclose tentative estimates hastily
prepared for enlightenment of management with no expectation for publication), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (no duty
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at the time of the alleged violation discouraged disclosure of soft informa-

tion.16 The Flynn court, however, stated that the law has begun to favor
disclosure of soft information in response to current trends in corporate
activity such as an increase in corporate mergers. 7 In this regard, the Third
Circuit in Flynn noted that the SEC has issued three releases indicating the
SEC's intention to promote disclosure of soft information." First, in 1976
the SEC deleted future earnings from the list of potentially misleading
disclosures. 9 Second, in 1978 the SEC issued a safe harbor rule for "forwardlooking" statements. ° Most recently, in 1980 the SEC authorized disclosure
of good faith appraisals made on a reasonable basis during the pendency of
proxy contests when the principal issue is the liquidation of all or a portion
of the target company's assets. 6'
To further illustrate that the present status of the law favors disclosure
of soft information, the Flynn court noted that the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, in Radol v. Thomas,62 held that
asset valuations are not immaterial as a matter of law and that the determination of materiality is for the jury to decide. 63 In Radol, the Mobil
Corporation (Mobil) announced a tender offer for 40 million shares of

exists to disclose estimates of sales and earnings for upcoming year unless estimates are made
with reasonable certainty); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.)
(no duty exists for managers to disclose asset valuations advanced as part of their bargaining
strategies because no truly reliable estimates ever materialized), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972); Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1328 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (defendant
has no duty to disclose speculative figures regarding earnings).
56. See 744 F.2d at 986; see also South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley
Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (Ninth Circuit refused to consider SEC
releases that encourage disclosure of management's projections and provide safe harbor rule
for such disclosures because alleged violations predated publication of releases); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1293 (2d Cir. 1973) (court applied law as it existed in
1963 in determining that defendant had no duty to disclose appraisals).
57. 744 F.2d at 986; see Note, Standstill Agreements: Enterra Validates Use of Standstill
Agreements to Govern Minority.Investment Programs,42 WASH. & LEE L. RaV. 1015, 1015, n.1.
(1985) (noting increase in corporate takeover activity in recent years).
58. 744 F.2d at 986-87; see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussion of recent
releases indicating SEC's intention to promote disclosure of soft information); cf. supra note
19 and accompanying text (SEC began to encourage disclosure of soft information in 1973).
59. See Securities Act Release No. 5699 (April 23,1976) (SEC deleted predictions of future
earnings from list of potentially misleading disclosures in note accompanying rule 14a-9).
60. See Securities Act Release No. 6084 (announcing adoption of safe harbor rule for
companies disclosing projections and other forward-looking data); see also supra note 19
(discussing provisions of safe harbor rule as set forth in Securities Act Release No. 6084).
61. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16833 (May 23, 1980). (SEC authorized
disclosure of asset valuations provided such valuations are made in good faith, on reasonable
basis, and concern proxy contests in which principal issue concerns liquidation of all or part of
company's assets or equity).
62. 556 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985).
63. See 744 F.2d at 987 (citing Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 576, 594 (S.D. Ohio
1983)).
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Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) for 85 dollars per share. 64 In response
to Mobil's tender offer, Marathon retained First Boston Corporation (First
Boston), an investment banker, to investigate alternative defenses to the
tender offer and to prepare a valuation report regarding Marathon's assets. 65
During the period that Mobil's offer remained open, United States Steel

Corporation (U.S. Steel) made a tender offer to purchase 30 million shares

of Marathon's outstanding stock at 125 dollars per share. 66 Marathon
shareholders tendered 91.18 percent of Marathon's outstanding shares to

U.S. Steel and subsequently approved the Marathon-U.S. Steel merger. 67
Marathon first advised the shareholders of the asset valuation reports in the
proxy statement regarding the U.S. Steel merger vote dated February 8,
1982.6" The proxy statement included the range of asset valuations of 189
dollars to 226 dollars per share and a disclaimer by the board of directors
69
as to the reliability and relevance of the reports.

Marathon shareholders initiated a class action suit alleging that Marathon
violated sections 14(e), 10(b), and rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act 0 by failing to
disclose the projected asset valuations to Marathon shareholders during the
64. See 556 F. Supp. at 587.
65. Id. In Radol, in response to the Mobil Corporation's (Mobil) tender offer for
Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) stock, Marathon directed the First Boston Corporation
(First Boston) to base the First Boston asset valuation report on Marathon solely upon
information available to the public. Id.The First Boston Report valued Marathon's assets at
$189 to $226 per share. Id. at 588. An asset valuation report generated internally by Marathon
valued Marathon's assets at $276 to $323 per share. Id. Marathon and First Boston prepared
the reports as selling documents and based their calculations on economic predictions and
projections of oil prices extending as far as fifty years into the future. Id. at 587-88. The asset
values contained in the First Boston and the Marathon reports included all of Marathon's
proven, probable and possible oil reserves. Id.
66. Id. at 588. During the period that Mobil's tender offer remained open, U.S. Steel
contacted Marathon concerning U.S. Steel's interest in acquiring Marathon. Id. During negotiations, Marathon provided U.S. Steel with copies of the asset valuation reports. Id. After nine
days of negotiations, Marathon and U.S. Steel entered into a merger agreement. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id.In Radol, the Marathon board of directors issued a proxy statement to Marathon
shareholders concerning the proposed merger between Marathon and U.S. Steel accompanied
by a disclaimer. Id. The proxy statement indicated that the directors did not view First Boston's
or Marathon's internally calculated asset valuations as representing per share values that could
realistically be received in a negotiated sale of the company as a going concern or through
liquidation of Marathon's assets. Id. n.6.
70. Id.at 593. Along with the allegations concerning Marathon's failure to disclose the
asset valuations, the plaintiffs in Radol challenged the two-tier merger as coercive and manipulative in violation of §14(e) of the Williams Act and §10(b) of the '34 Act. Id. at 589-90. The
plaintiffs also challenged Marathon's communications to its shareholders as unlawful proxy
solicitations under §14(a) of the '34 Act, and Marathon's mandatory fairness opinion as
inadequate under rule 13e-3 of the '34 Act. Id. at 591-92; see 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (§14(a) of the
'34 Act prohibits any person from soliciting any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe);
17 C.F.R. §240.13e-3 (Item 8(a) of Schedule 13e-3 requires issuers or affiliates to state in proxy
statement whether proposed transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders).
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tender offer.7 ' Marathon sought summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims. 72
7
After adopting the standard for materiality articulated in TSC Industries, 1
the district court in Radol rejected Marathon's contention that the asset
valuations reflected too great a level of uncertainty to meet the materiality
standard. 74 The district court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in TSC
Industries cautioned that some information is so unreliable that disclosure
may cause more harm to shareholders than good. 7s The Radol court,
76
however, held that asset valuations are not immaterial as a matter of law.
The Radol court concluded that the jury should decide the issue of whether
a reasonable shareholder would have accorded the asset valuations actual
77
significance.

In accordance with Radol, the Third Circuit in Flynn held that asset
valuations are not as a matter of law immaterial. 78 Rather, the Flynn court
stated that in determining whether a tender offeror has a duty to disclose

asset valuations and other soft information, courts must weigh the potential
benefits of disclosure to shareholders against the potential harm to shareholders. 79 The Third Circuit further stated that when evaluating the potential
71. Id. at 593.
72. Id.
73. 426 U.S. 438; see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing standard of
materiality under TSC Industries).
74. 556 F. Supp. at 593-94 (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449-50 (1976)).
75. 556 F. Supp. at 594 (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448
(1976)); see James V. Gerber Products Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) (sales figures,
projections, and forecasts are material only if calculated with substantial certainty). Accord
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir.) (projections, estimates and other
information must be reasonably certain before management may release such information to
public), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1092 (1981); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1980) (management must calculate internal projections with reasonable certainty before
disclosing such projections to public); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
265 (3d Cir. 1972) (no duty exists to disclose asset valuations because no truly reliable estimates
ever materialized).
76. 556 F. Supp. at 594. In affirming the district court's decision in Radol v. Thomas,
the Sixth Circuit specifically overruled the district court's determination that the asset valuations
were not immaterial as a matter of law. 772 F.2d 244, 253. The Sixth Circuit noted that in Starkman
v. Marathon Oil Co., the Sixth Circuit held that as a matter of law Marathon did not have a
duty to disclose the asset valuations involved in Radol and, therefore, the district court erred
in submitting the issue to the jury. Id.; see Starkman v. Marathon, 772 F.2d 231, 242 (6th Cir.
1985) (court held that Marathon did not have duty to disclose particular asset valuations because
valuations were not substantially certain to hold).
77. Id.; see TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining
materiality as when omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in deliberations of
reasonable shareholder).
78. See 744 F.2d at 988. In holding that asset valuations are not as a matter of law
immaterial, the Flynn court noted that the general time lag between the date of an alleged
violation and judicial resolution has tended to retard the evolution of disclosure laws because
courts have shown a reluctance to impose liability where the law has evolved in the interim. Id.
at 987-88; see supra note 56 and accompanying text (courts have refused to impose liability on
parties for failing to disclose soft information when law at time of alleged violation discouraged
such disclosure).
79. See 744 F.2d at 988.

19851

SOFT INFORMATION

harm to shareholders arising from disclosure of soft information, courts
should assess the potential harm under the assumption that a proper cautionary note accompanied the disclosed information 0 The Flynn court stated
that factors relevant in determining whether a duty to disclose soft information exists include the facts on which the information is based, the
qualifications of the individual or individuals who prepared the information,
the purpose for which the individuals prepared the information, the relevance
of the information to the stockholders' impending decision, the degree of
subjectivity or bias reflected in the preparation of the information, the degree
to which the information is unique, and the availability to the shareholder
of more reliable sources of information." After establishing an affirmative
duty for future tender offerors to disclose to target company shareholders
all material soft information, the Third Circuit analyzed the Flynn case
according to the disclosure laws as they existed at the time of the alleged
violation. 82 The Third Circuit concluded that under the law in effect at the
time of the alleged violation, the district court did not err in holding that
83
Bass Brothers did not have a duty to disclose asset appraisal valuations.
The Flynn court's determination that in the future a tender offeror has
a duty to disclose material soft information is a positive step forward in
84
removing what some commentators have described as a troubling anomaly.
These commentators have suggested that the SEC's view that soft information
is important enough to justify disclosure is inconsistent with the SEC's
decision not to make such disclosure mandatory. 5 An unfortunate aspect of
the Flynn decision, however, is that after establishing the factors relevant to
the balancing test for determining when a tender offeror has a duty to
disclose soft information, the Third Circuit failed to give meaningful guidance concerning the relative significance of the seven factors.16 For example,
in stating that courts should first examine the facts upon which the preparer
of the soft information based the calculations, the Flynn court did not discuss
the appropriate characteristics that courts should consider in determining
whether the underlying facts form an adequate basis for calculating the soft
80. Id.; see Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532, 573 (D. Del. 1975)
(approving release of appraisal values with appropriate disclaimer).
81. See 744 F.2d at 988; see also infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text (discussion of
proper analysis under Flynn balancing test).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 989.
84. See infra note 85 (citing commentators who suggest that disclosure of soft information
should be mandatory).
85. See Gray, Proposalsfor Systematic Disclosure of Corporate Forecasts, FINANCIAL
ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb., 64, 67 (1973) (forecasting should remain voluntary through trial period,
but fairness to investors requires more systematic disclosure); Merrifield, Projections in SEC
Filings:Debate Rages Over Worth, 2 SEC 149, 154 (1974) (all investors should have access to
forward-looking information because institutional investors have access to such information);
Reiling & Burton, Financial Statements: Signposts As Well As Milestones, HARv. Bus. REV.
Nov.-Dec. 1972 at 45, 53 (decision whether to disclose forecasts to public should not be in
hands of corporate management).
86. See 774 F.2d at 988; see also supra text accompanying note 81 (listing factors that
courts must analyze in applying Flynn balancing test).
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information.8 7 While the Flynn court probably would require the disclosure
of soft information when the preparer calculated the information by relying
on historical data and reasonable assumptions regarding expected changes in
levels of sales, costs, and other relevant forecasting data, the Flynn court
would not require or even allow the disclosure of soft information based on
far less dependable sources, such as the preparer's favorite psychic.
In between these two extremes, assuming that the facts are sufficiently
current, courts should consider two characteristics of the facts upon which
the soft information is based. First, as the facts upon which the soft
information is based become more complex and speculative, a court should
be less inclined to find that the resulting calculations will be more of an aid
than a harm to the shareholders. For example, in Resource Exploration v.
Yankee Oil and Gas, Inc.,8 Resource Exploration (Resource) hired a petroleum engineering firm to prepare a report evaluating the extent and value of
its oil and gas reserves.8 9 In calculating the value of Resource's reserves, the
engineering firm analyzed individual well information relative to past production data, performance history, well location, percent of interest in each
well, status of any leases regarding the wells, gas and oil prices, production
reserves and temperatures and other engineering data, and operating costs. 9°
On the basis of this information, the engineering firm arrived at the estimated
present value of the reserves by factoring in projected future prices of oil
and gas, operating costs, and present value discount rates. 91 In view of the
first factor of the Flynn balancing test, the complex and speculative nature
of the facts upon which the engineering firm in Resource Exploration based
its calculations may render the resulting valuations so unreliable that the
potential harm to shareholders relying on such information may outweigh
the benefits. However, the speculative nature of the facts underlying the soft
information may not in and of itself preclude a duty to disclose the
information. In Securities Act Release No. 5992, for example, the SEC
recognized that in situations involving new and promotional companies,
speculative forecasts may be the most valuable information available to
investors. 92 The SEC, however, noted that the disclosure of soft information
without the disclosure of the assumptions underlying the information may
render such information misleading. 9
Another characteristic of the facts upon which the preparer based the
soft information which courts should consider is the procedure the preparer
employed to determine the relevant facts and assumptions underlying the
87. See supra text accompanying note 81 (first factor that courts must analyze in applying
Flynn balancing test is facts on which preparer of soft information based information).
88. 566 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
89. Id. at 58.
90. Id. at 59.
91. Id.

92. See Securities Act Release No. 5992 (November 7, 1978) (previous history of operations
is not necessary in all instances for company to provide reasonable based projections).
93. Id.
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calculations. 94 Under the Flynn balancing test, courts should require disclosure of soft information only when the preparer selected and weighed the
relevant data and determined the basic assumptions in a consistent and
logical manner. 95 As data selection and assumption determinations become
arbitrary and inconsistent, the resulting calculations become less useful to
the shareholder. For example, the case of South Coast Service Corp. v.
Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co. 96 represents such an informal approach to
property valuations which the Flynn court probably would not require
disclosure. In South Coast, the Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co. (SAVI)
board of directors prepared valuations of SAVI's assets in response to a
possible tender offer2w To arrive at the overall property valuations, each
director suggested a high, medium, and low value for each parcel on the
basis of his own experience and knowledge. 9 The directors did not set
guidelines for calculating their individual valuations and did not discuss their
assumptions.99 From the pool of estimates, the SAVI general manager selected
a figure to represent the high, medium, and low values for each item of
property and instructed SAVI's accounting firm to prepare a report displaying the valuations in balance sheet format. " ° Because each director relied
solely on his own experience, knowledge and assumptions in arriving at the
valuations, without first setting forth basic guidelines or assumptions, the
potential harm in the case of shareholder reliance probably would weigh
against disclosure under the Flynn balancing test.
The second factor that the Flynn court directed courts to consider when
determining whether the disclosure of soft information will aid or harm the
shareholder is the qualifications of the individual or individuals who prepared
the information.' 0' Two aspects of the preparer's expertise that could influence the reliability of soft information are the preparer's knowledge of the
particular business and industry and the preparer's experience with financial
valuations and forecasting. In South Coast, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
courts should not require disclosure of property valuations unless the preparers of the valuations were professional or expert appraisers. 102 Contrary
to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, however, in Securities Act Release No. 5992
the SEC stated that experience in projecting may not be necessary in all
94. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (listing factors that courts must analyze in
applying Flynn balancing test).
95. See supra text accompanying note 81 (courts must analyze facts on which preparer
based soft information in applying Flynn balancing test).
96. 669 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. Id. at 1267-68.
98. Id. at 1268.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See 744 F.2d at 988 (Flynn court listing factors that courts must analyze in applying
Flynn balancing test).
102. See 669 F.2d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (in affirming district court's decision that
defendant properly excluded asset valuations from proxy statement, Ninth Circuit noted that
preparers of valuations were not experts).
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instances to provide reasonably based projections. 03 This appears to be a
rational rule because any lack of sophistication on the part of the preparer
could be offset in most cases if the preparer sets forth the assumptions
underlying the calculations. For example, an unsophisticated preparer could
make projections based on historical data adjusted for estimated percentage
increases or decreases in net sales, operating costs, and any other appropriate
economic and financial factors. By disclosing such assumptions, the preparer
allows each shareholder to determine whether such assumptions appear
reasonable.
When a preparer lacks knowledge regarding the particular industry or
business, however, there may be no way for the shareholder to determine
whether the preparer has considered the appropriate factors that may effect
a company's performance in the future. For example, a preparer lacking
expertise concerning the oil and gas industry would be unable to analyze the
technical aspects of the business with the degree of sophistication necessary
to ensure that the resulting valuations would be sufficiently reliable. Since
any technical aspects of the business or industry that the preparer overlooks
in the calculations will not surface in the disclosed assumptions, courts
applying the Flynn test should not require disclosure when the preparer is
unfamiliar with the industry.
The third factor enumerated in the Flynn opinion requires courts to
consider the purpose for which the preparer originally intended to use the
information.' °4 Courts should examine the original purpose of the soft
information according to the impact that such purpose has on the fifth
factor listed by the Flynn court. The fifth factor requires courts to consider
the degree of subjectivity or bias reflected in the preparation of the soft
information. 0 5 Assuming that the bias or subjectivity reflected in the soft
information is not a function of inadequate or incorrect information or the
result of inexperience on the part of the preparer of the soft information,
then any remaining bias or subjectivity probably is directly related to the
purpose for which the individual prepared the information. Informational
distortions relating to the purposes of the calculations can be categorized as
goal-oriented or procedural. 0 6 Goal-oriented bias results when the preparer
frames the underlying facts and assumptions in a manner that best serves
the purpose of the document. 0 7 Goal-oriented bias commonly will arise when

103. See Securities Act Release No. 5992 (November 7, 1978) (experience in calculating
projections is not necessary in all instances to provide reasonably based projections).
104. See 744 F.2d at 988 (Flynn court listing factors that courts must analyze in applying
Flynn balancing test).
105. Id.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10 (discussing difference between goal-oriented
and procedural bias).
107. See, e.g., Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 210 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant
prepared cash flow projections to be used as selling document to secure financial alternatives
to proposed tender offer); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.)
(defendant updated earnings projections used internally for planning and development to

19851

SOFT INFORMATION

the preparer provides soft information for selling documents, such as documents designed to encourage investors to buy shares, because such calcula-

tions generally will be based on optimistic assumptions in order to present
the company in the most favorable light.',' Procedural bias or subjectivity
will arise when conditions that precipitate the need for the soft information
require the preparer to take short cuts in evaluating the available information.
For example, in Panterv. MarshallField & Co., 1o9 Marshall Field employees

hastily updated a five-year plan in one day in an effort to provide the
Marshall Field board members with information necessary to evaluate a
tender offer.", Under the Flynn balancing test, the procedural bias evident
in the preparation of the updated plan should weigh against disclosure

because preparers cannot present adequately in a statement of assumptions
the short cuts employed in the analysis of the available information. When

the purpose for which the preparer calculated the soft information results in
goal-oriented bias, however, courts should require disclosure under the third
factor of the Flynn balancing test because presentation of the underlying
assumptions on which the preparer based the calculations would enable the
shareholder to evaluate the reasonableness of the assumptions and take into
account the degree of goal-oriented bias reflected in the calculations.
The fourth factor which courts must consider under the Flynn balancing

test is the relevance of the soft information to the shareholders' decision
whether to accept or reject the tender offer."' The Third Circuit's inclusion
of this factor in the balancing test requires a comparison of the relevance of
the soft information to the soft information's reliability. For example, a
possibility exists that soft information would be relevant to a shareholder's
decision, and yet be unreliable."12 In addition, the degree of the relevance of
evaluate adequacy of proposed tender offer), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1092 (1981); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant prepared earnings
projections for each of its manufacturing plants to be used for selling purposes); Resource
Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 64 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (defendant
prepared valuations for purpose of securing bank loan); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586,
588 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (defendant prepared asset valuations to be used as selling document to
attract more favorable tender offers); Alaska Interstate Company v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp.
532, 544 (D. Del. 1975) (defendant calculated cash flow projections to be used internally for
planning process and to be used in connection with debt refinancing).
108. See, e.g., Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 210 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant
prepared cash flow projections to be used as selling document to secure financial alternatives
to proposed tender offer); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (2d Cir.
1973) (defendant prepared earnings projections for each of its manufacturing plants to be used
for selling purposes); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 588 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (defendant
prepared asset valuations to be used as selling document to attract more favorable tender
offers).
109. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).

110. 646 F.2d at 292.
111. See 744 F.2d at 988 (Flynn court listing factors that courts must analyze in applying
Flynn balancing test).
112. See Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil and Gas, 566 F. Supp. 54, 59 (N.D. Ohio
1983) (although valuation of target company's potential oil and gas resources would be quite
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soft information to a shareholder's decision and the degree of the soft
information's reliability can vary. The Flynn factors discussed up to this
point address the reliability aspect of soft information. ' 3 Courts should
examine the previously discussed Flynn factors to determine the degree of
the soft information's reliability." 4 If soft information is highly relevant but
not reliable, then the soft information would have a greater potential for
harm than aid to the shareholder. Courts, therefore, should not impose a
duty to disclose highly relevant soft information that is not reliable. Conversely, if highly relevant soft information is reliable, a greater potential
exists for aid to the shareholder than harm. The tender offeror, therefore,
should have a duty to disclose highly relevant soft information that is
reliable. As the degree of the relevance of soft information to the shareholders' decision diminishes, a correspondingly higher degree of reliability should
be necessary to justify the imposition of a disclosure duty. Whenever the
soft information is not relevant at all to the shareholders' decision, courts
should hold that the soft information is not material as a matter of law no
matter how reliable the information is, and decide the issue on summary
judgment.
A more common and difficult problem arises, however, when the soft
information is neither clearly reliable nor clearly unreliable. In such situations, the degree of relevance to the shareholders' decision does not address
the overriding issue of whether disclosure of the soft information would
result in greater potential harm or aid to the shareholder. For example, when
the soft information is slightly unreliable, the fact that the information is
highly relevant does not enable the court to infer that disclosure of the
slightly unreliable information will have a greater potential for aiding than
harming the shareholder. Therefore, when the soft information is neither
clearly reliable nor clearly unreliable, courts should analyze the degree of
relevance of the information only to determine whether the information has
some relevance to the decision of the shareholder. If the information has
some degree of relevance, courts should then analyze the other Flynn factors
to determine whether the tender offeror has a duty to disclose the soft
information.
The last two factors that the Flynn court found to be relevant to deciding
whether soft information must be disclosed are the degree to which information is unique and the availability of more reliable sources. "5 Both of

relevant to shareholders' decision of whether to tender their shares, such calculations are so
complex and speculative that any such valuations necessarily would be somewhat unreliable).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 87-110 (discussing appropriate analysis of facts on
which soft information is based, qualifications of individuals who prepared information, purpose
for which individuals prepared information, and degree of subjectivity and bias reflected in
preparation of information).
114. Id.
115. See 744 F.2d at 988 (Flynn court listing factors that courts must analyze in applying
Flynn balancing test).
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these factors address the issue of whether the target company shareholders
have access to substantially the same information that the tender offeror
possesses. Accordingly, the Flynn court probably would place great weight
on these two factors when the tender offeror has sole control of the
information at issue. Similarly, courts should take into account any barriers
to access of information from alternative sources such as cost and time
constraints when determining whether a tender offeror has a duty to disclose
under the last two factors of the Flynn balancing test.
Had the Flynn court analyzed the Prochemco reports under the proposed
balancing test the outcome of the decision may have been different. Although
evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that the basis for the first Prochemco report was a report that a Prochemco employee previously had
prepared," 6 the presence of public reports and documents, historical operating costs and asset values concerning National Alfalfa included as part of
the Prochemco report provided a sufficient basis of information on which
to calculate asset valuations. Moreover, Prochemco had considerable experience regarding acquisitions. ' 7 While the evidence did not demonstrate that
the company possessed expertise in appraising the type of land involved in
the National Alfalfa tender offer, Prochemco did have considerable experience in dealing with land acquisitions for the purpose of ranching.' I, Further,
in conducting its investigation of National Alfalfa, Prochemco relied on
persons knowledgeable in farm real estate, as well as the Soil Conservation
Service." 9 Since Prochemco prepared the reports as documents to obtain
financing for the acquisition of National Alfalfa, 20 Prochemco probably
presented the calculations in the most favorable light possible. While this
bias may have resulted in overly optimistic calculations, such an outcome is
not fatal to the plaintiffs' claim. Disclosure of the basic assumptions on
which Prochemco based the calculations would allow shareholders to determine for themselves whether the assumptions appear valid in light of present
economic conditions. Another important consideration weighing in favor of
requiring Bass Brothers to disclose the Prochemco asset valuations is that
other, more reliable asset valuations concerning National Alfalfa were not
available. On balance, the potential aid to shareholders that would result
from Bass Brothers' disclosure of Prochemco's asset valuations would outweigh the potential harm from such disclosure. Moreover, Bass Brothers
could minimize any potential for shareholder harm arising from undue
reliance by providing a cautionary note disclaiming the reliability of the
valuations.
The balancing test set forth by the Third Circuit in Flynn entails more
than simply weighing the factors to determine whether the potential benefits

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
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988.
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of disclosure to the shareholders outweigh any countervailing harm. The
Flynn court held that courts must examine the potential harm to shareholders,

such as undue reliance on the soft information, with the assumption that a
disclaimer as to the reliability of the information will accompany the soft
information.12 ' Arguably, such a warning to shareholders could defuse
substantially the potential for undue reliance by investors and tip the scales

in favor of potential aid to the shareholders. Even when the soft information
may be quite unreliable, disclosure of the information along with the

underlying assumptions on which the preparer based the calculations and an
appropriate cautionary note would be more beneficial to the shareholder

than no disclosure at all. The Flynn court may have established a rule that
stops just short of mandatory disclosure in all cases. Under the Flynn rule,
the prudent attorney should advise tender offerors to disclose soft information with appropriate disclaimers to target company shareholders in all
circumstances unless the soft information clearly lacks a reasonable basis in
fact.
Williams Act proponents generally advanced three justifications for

placing disclosure requirements on tender offerors. First, shareholders need
to possess the same data as the tender offeror to enable shareholders to

make an informed decision concerning the offer. 22 Second, the securities
laws should impose disclosure requirements on tender offerors that are similar
to those requirements applied in other transfer situations such as exchange

offers and proxy contests.'2 Third, disclosure requirements will aid in
protecting corporations from corporate raiders by enabling shareholders to

make an informed decision regarding whether to tender their shares to tender
offerors planning to sell all or some of the corporate assets. 24 The disclosure
requirements supported and passed by the Williams Act proponents impose
121. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing Flynn court's requirement of
disclaimer accompanying disclosure of soft information).
122. See Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and CorporatePurchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
LAW 149, 150 (1966) (disclosures by tender offeror are necessary to enable public investors to
stand on equal footing in assessing value of company's shares); see also supra note 7 (Congress
enacted Williams Act to ensure that tender offerors would provide target company shareholders
with sufficient information to make best possible investment decision).
123. See Cohen, supra note 122, at 152 (cash tender offerors should be under same duty
of disclosure as exchange offerors). Mr. Cohen, the former Chairman of the SEC, reasoned
that a shareholder's decision not to tender shares in response to a tender offer is quite similar
to a shareholder's decision to accept an exchange offer in that both decisions amount to an
investment in a new company. Id.; see supra note 9 (discussion of Senator Williams noting
need to fill gap in securities laws by subjecting tender offerors to same disclosure requirements
that are imposed on individuals seeking control of corporations through either exchange offers
or proxy contests).
124. See 111 Cong. Rec. 8257-58 (Oct. 22, 1965) (Congress should protect corporations
from corporate raiders). Commenting on an earlier version of the Williams Act, Senator
Williams stated that white-collar pirates must be prevented from seizing control of "proud old
companies," selling or trading away the best assets, and dividing the proceeds among themselves.
Id. The Williams Act as enacted, however, disavowed any desire to discourage tender offers.
See supra note 7 (discussion of legislative history concerning Williams Act).
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an affirmative duty on the tender offeror to disclose information about the
identity and background of the purchaser, the tender offer transaction itself,
and any intended merger activity or change in the business structure. 25 By
extending tender offer disclosure requirements to include soft information
regarding the target company, the Flynn court is ignoring a basic premise
that underlies other disclosure requirements present in the federal securities
laws. 26 Generally, the securities laws impose a duty to disclose information
about a corporation on corporate insiders 2 7 or persons who owe some
fiduciary duty to the corporation.2 s In tender offer situations, the initial
tender offeror incurs significant costs to locate and evaluate potential target
corporations. 129 Under the Flynn rule the tender offeror having no relationship with the target company is required to disclose to the shareholders, and
for practical purposes to potential competing tender offerors, a significant
amount of information that the tender offeror has learned through his own
efforts and expertise concerning the worth of the target company. The Flynn
court's soft information disclosure rule will result in the loss of at least a
portion of the reward that an informational advantage will give the tender
offeror. By requiring the tender offeror to disclose material soft information
such as asset valuations or projected earnings, courts may place the target
company shareholders in a position to force the tender offeror to increase
the offering price or risk the success of the takeover bid. Moreover, disclosure
requirements may result in lower rewards to the tender offeror by enabling
125. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing tender offer disclosure requirements).
126. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (discussion of cases holding that duty
to disclose under securities laws generally arises out of some special relationship between person
possessing information and company).
127. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (corporate
insiders or any person in possession of material inside information must either disclose such
information to investing public or abstain from trading while information remains undisclosed),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
128. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). In In re Cady, Roberts,
& Co., the SEC stated that the obligation to disclose material, nonpublic information or refrain
from trading rests on two elements. Id. The first element that courts must consider to establish
a duty to disclose is the existence of a relationship between the corporation and a third party
that results in giving the third party access to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose. Id. The second element that courts must consider to establish a duty to
disclose is the inherent unfairness of allowing the third party to take advantage of such inside
information when the other party involved in the transaction does not have access to such
information. Id.
129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Sunk Costs in Tender Offers]. Along with the costs
associated with investment banking fees, tender offerors invest their own time searching for
potential target companies. Id. The search time invested by tender offerors results in substantial
lost opportunity costs of managers' time because the search process generally covers many firms
in addition to the firm eventually selected for a takeover bid. Id. Tender offerors also incur
costs to assemble and hold capital ready for a possible acquisition. Id. Finally, tender offerors
incur costs in the form of actual and potential losses arising from overbids which result from
incomplete access to information. Id.
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subsequent bidders, relying on the original tender offeror's information, to
extend competing tender offers. 3 ' In order to receive the rewards of his
search, the original tender offeror will be forced to outbid the competing
tender offeror.' 3' Furthermore, by avoiding the costs of procuring such
information, the competing tender offeror may be able to outbid the original
tender offeror, thus denying the original tender offeror any rewards from
his work. 32 The demands for higher offering prices by target company
shareholders and the increase in competing tender offers that will result from
the tender offeror's disclosure of soft information will increase the costs for
transacting takeover bids and thus will decrease the number of takeover
bids.' 33

Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have argued persuasively that a
decrease in tender offer activity will result in the entrenchment of inefficient
management to the detriment of current shareholders.'3 4 The basic premise

underlying their argument is that the securities market is an efficient capital
market.'3 5 In an efficient capital market, all available information about a
130. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders'
Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW 1733, 1739 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Takeover Bids]. Competing tender
offerors can lower their search costs by relying on information disclosed by the original tender
offeror and by confining their investigations to identified target companies. Id. By reducing
their search costs, competing tender offerors can outbid the original tender offeror and still
earn a profit through the tender offer. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of A
Target's Management Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1178-79 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as The Proper Role of Target's Management]. For example, if the original
tender offeror incurred search costs of $10 per share and learned that outsiders could better
manage corporation X so that the shares would be valued at $90 each, the original tender
offeror could earn a profit on any offering price below $80 per share. Id. at 1178. By avoiding
the $10 search costs incurred by the original tender offeror, however, the competing tender
offeror could earn a profit on any offering price below $90 per share. Id. at 1178-79.
131. See supra note 130 (subsequent bidders can rely on information disclosed by original
tender offeror to extend competing tender offer).
132. See supra note 130 (by avoiding search costs, competing tender offerors may be able
to outbid original tender offerors).
133. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, supra note 129, at 7 (inability
of original tender offerors to appropriate full value of information will result in reduction of
number of tender offers).
134. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (tender offer activity results in increased
shareholder wealth). See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management, supra note 130 (arguing that target company strategies adopted to resist tender offers
result in reduction in shareholders' wealth); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note
130 (arguing that target company management should assume passive role in responding to
tender offers and let shareholders decide whether to tender target company shares); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, supranote 129 (arguing that target company managers
should not solicit competing tender offer bids because such auctioneering results in reduction
in shareholders' wealth). But see R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 146-51 (1983)
(arguing that conglomerate mergers do not increase efficiency of America's capital market,
serve useful industrial purpose, or benefit employees).
135. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management, supra note
130, at 1165-68 & infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing efficient capital market
theory). See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REv. 549 (1984) (explanation of elements that lead to and limit market efficiency).
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company's securities immediatey is reflected in the price of the securities. 3 6

Therefore, when a company is ineffectively or inefficiently managed, the
market will accurately and promptly reflect this fact by setting the price of
37
the security below the security's potential value under better management.
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, tender offerors monitor the activities

of corporate managers and make tender offer bids for those corporations
whose stock prices are low because of inferior management.' 3 8 By replacing
the inferior management team with a more competent team, the actual and
anticipated improvements in management performance will result in an
increase in the price of the security. 39 The result of a completed tender offer
is that the shareholders of the target corporation obtain a profit because of
the tender offeror's premium bid, and the tender offeror earns or expects to
earn an ordinary profit on his investment. 40 Moreover, the tender offerors'
monitoring process benefits all shareholders by motivating managers to
reduce management costs and maximize share value, thus protecting man-

136. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management, supra note
130, at 1165. Under the efficient capital market theory the price of stock and the stock's value
will be almost identical in large markets for shares. Id. Since a large number of sophisticated
investors exist in the market place, investors would buy underpriced shares and sell overpriced
shares so quickly that investors could not make systematic gains by finding undervalued shares.
Id. As investors bought and sold shares on the basis of their knowledge, this arbitrage process
would drive the stock price up or down to reflect the correct current value of the corporation.
Id. Once information about a firm reached the market, prices would adjust immediately because
no rational trader would sell shares at a lower price than the trader could obtain after the news

became widespread. Id. This search for new information and continuous trading ensures that
the market prices reflect all available information. Id.

137. See supra note 136 (discussing efficient capital market theory).
138. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management, supra note
130, at 1173. Tender offerors monitor the performance of managerial teams by comparing the
corporation's potential value with the corporation's current value as reflected in the price of

the security. Id. At some point the variance between the corporation's potential value and its
value as reflected by the market price become so great that a tender offeror can acquire the
firm at a premium above market price and still profit by improving the management. Id.
Easterbrook and Fischel describe the source of the variance between a corporation's potential
value and stock market value as agency costs. Id. at 1170. Agency costs are the consequence of
separation of ownership and control in large publicly owned corporations, where much of the
benefit of each manager's performance inures to shareholders, bondholders, or other managers.
Id. This sharing of benefits may cause some managers to avoid responsibilities, consume
perquisites, or otherwise further their own interests at the expense of the company. Id.
Easterbrook and Fischel state that some of the most important agency costs are incurred when
managers fail to take all cost-justified steps to recruit and train employees for their jobs. Id.
139. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 130, at 1739. Studies show that
prices of target company securities generally decline relative to the market for approximately
40 months prior to the tender offer. Id. The tender offers generally result in restoring the prices
of the securities to the levels that existed prior to the 40 month decline. Id. at 1739-40. See
generally BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REMEDIES (1980);
WESTON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND GROWTH, II MERGERS AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY (1980).

140. Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of Target'sManagement, supra note 130, at
1173-74.
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agement from the threat of a tender offer.14' Easterbrook and Fischel argue
that the inability of tender offerors to recover the full value of their soft
information will result in a reduction in monitoring activity by tender
offerors. 42 Such a reduction in monitoring activity, according to Easterbrook
and Fischel, will result in the entrenchment of inefficient management to the
43
detriment of all shareholders.
The Flynn court's decision to impose a duty upon tender offerors to
disclose soft information ensures that shareholders of target companies will
have the same material information as tender offerors.'" Access to such soft
information can be extremely important to the shareholders' decision whether
to tender their shares. The Flynn court's balancing test, however, fails to
provide tender offerors with clear guidance as to when a duty to disclose
soft information arises. 41 Moreover, the ultimate result of requiring tender
offerors to disclose soft information may be a reduction in the number of
acquisitions and the amount of monitoring by tender offerors.146 The decrease
in monitoring could undermine the efficiency of our capitalist system by
allowing the entrenchment of less efficient management, ultimately leading
47
to lower returns on investment, and a reduction in shareholders' wealth.
ROBERT B. MCINTOSH

141. Id. at 1174.
142. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Sunk Costs In Tender Offers, supra note 129, at 2-7
(arguing that target company managers should not solicit competing tender offer bids because
such auctioneering reduces tender offeror monitoring and ultimately shareholders' wealth).
143. Id. at 2 (decrease in tender offeror monitoring activity results in higher agency costs
and thus in lower returns on shareholders' investments).
144. See supra text accompanying note 79 (tender offerors must disclose soft information
whenever potential benefits of disclosure to shareholders outweigh potential harm to shareholders).
145. See supra text accompanying note 86 (Third Circuit in Flynn failed to give meaningful
guidance concerning the relative significance of various factors).
146. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (requiring tender offeror to disclose
soft information will lower rewards to tender offeror and result in reduction of tender offeror

monitoring activity).
147. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (reduction in tender offeror monitoring
of corporate managers ultimately will lead to lower returns on investment and decrease in
shareholders' wealth).

